Dr Indrajit Roy – A Multiplex World: Southern multilateralism, Global Leadership and Scholarship on the Global South

Dr Indrajit Roy is professor of global development politics at the University of York’s Department of Politics and International Relations, with his research focusing on the transforming role of states and societies in the global South in innovating ideas and practices of global development. Dr Roy previously worked in the development sector, and held fellowships at Oxford University’s Department of International Development and Wolfson College He is also a fellow of the Higher Education Academy, and has contributed to publications in the Hindustan Times, Global Policy, the Guardian, the Telegraph and Economic Times, among others. In this interview, Dr Roy discussed the concept and nature of Southern Multilateralism, the leadership of the global south, and the emerging ‘multiplex’ world order.

What capacity do states like the UK in the Global North have for engaging with this southern multilateralism?

Southern multilateralism is not designed to be exclusive, or exclude the Global North. Southern multilateralism is about showing the Global South’s capacity for leadership, and its ability to pursue its interests in global affairs. Others are welcome in this process, so Southern Multilateralism is not intended to entrench a south/north dichotomy.

It is tempting to see leading states in the Global South as spoilers or shirkers of the global order, but instead we need to see these states as sharers, looking to participate in global governance and to share responsibilities with the north. In this context, then, countries in the Global North like the UK are welcome to support Southern multilateralism. The problem arises when states in the Global North see themselves as the natural leaders of these organisations or movements. If the Global North is able to overcome this limitation and willing to work alongside the Global South then they will be welcome. I do think that many colleagues in the UK and elsewhere in Europe have started appreciating this, and the benefits of working this way.

How do you think Southern multilateralism will be consolidated or instituted? What institutions will constitute it and what norms will dominate it?

I don’t think southern multilateralism intends to be a mirror image of the liberal international order in its coherence. Thinking of Southern Multilateralism as a patchwork of different orders may be more fruitful. In this context, I find Amitav Acharya’s concept of ‘multiplexity’ useful, as it recognises that Southern multilateralism is a blend of different things. Examples of how Southern multilateralism is becoming instituted are through organisations like the New Development Bank (NDB) also known as the BRICS bank, which has borrowed a lot from the design of multilateral banks in the Global North but has its own unique approach that is complementary.

I don’t think it is possible to have a single set of norms governing these institutions in the Global South, because each state is so different and there is a long history of mutual acrimony between them. For example China and India are often facing down each other’s troops on the Himalayas even as their representatives sit together on the NDB’s Board. The members of the BRICS are incredibly diverse compared to such Northern organisations as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in terms of norms, culture, race and society. Despite these differences, these states try to work together in order to give leadership to the Global South. However, I don’t think a specific set of norms is on the cards or even desirable. Individual countries may have views of how they want the world to be governed, but they are in no position to impose that on any other state. The issue of norms in the leadership of the Global South will be a conversation that will go on for a very long time, but I think that’s a good thing as it will give states the ability to negotiate and improvise in their cooperation. Some may see this as anarchy and chaos, but I see an order-in-the-making or a convivial order of incomplete conversations, which is appropriate in a world where we are all essentially strangers to one another.

There is a variety of views about the centrality of China to the leadership of the Global South, especially in organisations like BRICS. How do you interpret the centrality of China to Southern multilateralism?

There is no question that China has the ‘money bags’ in the BRICS. It is for this reason that it is a welcome member of this club. To be clear, southern cooperation existed long before China emerged as a global economic superpower; we can see the Global South emerging in the 70s amidst the discussions around the ‘New International Economic Order’. Southern Multilateralism draws on these earlier solidarities and repurposes them by mobilising the economic might of the “power South”, the group of Southern countries that are able to overcome the economic legacy of colonialism: this refers to China but also others such as Indonesia and India, Brazil and South Africa, and Turkey. Indeed, the earliest example of Southern Multilateralism might well have been the IBSA Trilateral, the agreement for development cooperation by India, Brazil and South Africa, that preceded the BRICS by a few years.

We could in fact see the BRICS as an effort by the IBSA states to include China to give the movement more heft and garner more attention. Something similar could be said for Russia, which makes the West pay attention to the BRICS. It’s true that China has more economic power than the other members combined, but to say that it dictates the BRICS agenda is misleading.

The expansion of BRICS in recent years is also a negotiated process, it’s not true to say that China has just brought its friends into the BRICS. You also have traditionally pro-western powers like the UAE and Indonesia joining, the latter is also a member of IPEF. You have various interests jostling with each other within BRICS, and it would be impossible for China to dominate it. Some have argued that China has pushed for the expansion of BRICS to reduce the power of the other four states in it, but that only goes to show that China is not able to dominate it to the extent that it would like.

What is the approach of India to Southern multilateralism, and do the differing approaches of states like China and India threaten or complement southern multilateralism?

India’s approach to southern multilateralism has been based in anti-imperialism since decolonisation, with initiatives like sending technical experts to states in the Global South. India’s approach since the turn of the millennium can be seen in India’s bilateral alliance building with other states, such as India and Brazil’s cooperation in the WTO in the early 21^st century, and their smashing of the quad within that body which functioned as the informal decision-maker. During the pandemic, India and South Africa worked together around intellectual property rights, offering a good example of how agile and strong India’s relations in the Global South can be. Many of these connections originate in connections made in the 40s and 50s and build on the goodwill garnered by India during the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Monetarily, India does not have a lot of money compared to China, so it’s not in a position to provide a lot of cash; instead it uses loans at a smaller scale. The vast majority of its power comes through alliance building. Increasingly, India is seeking to join multilateral infrastructure and investment initiatives such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and the international North-South Transport Corridor.

Does this mean that the southern multilateralisms led by China and by India are complementary? I think not. Complementarity suggests intentionality, and I don’t think either China and India intend to complement one another’s offerings. However, their different approaches and offerings do have the effect of complementing each other despite no coordinated planning. Thus, despite active hostilities between China and India, and their different approaches to Southern Multilateralism, do not threaten southern multilateralism at all.

You raise some important points about knowledge production in your article ‘Connected Politics of Global Development’. Why do you think that development studies and international relations are often disconnected?

The disconnect between disciplines such as development studies and international relations has a great deal to do with a purported division of labour within the social sciences. International Relations was typically seen as dealing with relatively powerful actors on the international stage, while development studies was about the ways in which relatively weaker actors went about attempting to transform their societies. Only some scholars, such as the Dependency Theorists, sought to connect the processes delineated by the two disciplines, for the most part however, academics were content to treat these as parallel processes. IR then became, like politics, economics and sociology, about societies in the global North that had achieved ‘development’. Development Studies, like anthropology, was about societies in the global South that were on their journey towards ‘development’. The global North had history, the global South was in its ‘waiting room’. A hierarchical binary immediately arose between the global North and the global South: the knowledge produced in and of the North was universal, applicable to all whereas the knowledge on and by the South was particular, only ever relevant to specific quarters.

Such a disconnect did a great deal of disservice to our understanding of how ideas, institutions and practices in fact circulated between the global South and global North. For example, the wealth accumulated by the global North cannot be considered in isolation from its exploitation through colonialism and imperialism of the global South. Similarly, ideas of progress are often thought to be Northern impositions on the global South: in fact, however, such ideas were part and parcel of the anti-colonial movements championed by and in the global South.

Could you explain the relationship between particularism and universalism that you identify; how are they interconnected and how do we move beyond the false dichotomy?

Universalism refers to the possibility that ideas have generalisable applicability. I am entirely sympathetic to this possibility. What is problematic for me is the belief that it is only the ideas originating in Europe and elsewhere in the global North that are universal: the idea is that such ideas and associated values emanate in the North and are then diffused across the world as an ideal. Some see these values as being diffused through the education of the Global North provided to the South, whereas others would see it as being transmitted through the violence of colonialism. Either way, both of these views accept that a specific view originated in the north and was then transmitted.

Particularism is instead the idea that you have specific ideas that are only ever relevant to specific places. It is often assumed that particular ideas don’t interact with each other, and that each society tends to develop and nurture its own ideas. These are seen to be especially true for ideas and norms originating outside the global North: ideas originating in the global South are rarely seen to be making a contribution to ideas associated with the global North.

The reason I think this is a false dichotomy is because universal values always have particular roots. Let’s take the example of the Enlightenment as a universal value: it would, however, be troublesome to think of the Enlightenment as uniquely European or originating in a specific part of Europe. The transfer of ideas that made the Enlightenment possible originated in many different world regions: Arabic influences, Mongol transmissions, ideas from China and India, all fed into the Renaissance and were constantly in contact with one another. Europe wasn’t an isolated region that suddenly erupted on the world scene, there was constant exchange of people, ideas, diseases and more. What’s particularly jarring is when we, for example, associate Enlightenment ideas like liberty with France (and of course the values of the French Revolution are important), but we can't ignore the role of Haiti in shaping some of those ideas at a time when the Haitians were being exploited by the French and then overthrew them to establish the world’s first Black republic. Labelling what was going on in France as “universal”, and what was going on in Haiti as “particular”, doesn’t do justice either to France or Haiti. The ideas of emancipation and liberty were developed in conversation across South and North, and the connections between movements and societies are essential for understanding the origins and development of those ideas. Therefore, these ideas can originate in one place at one time, but are informed by other places and peoples, and can emerge independently in different places at different times. The binary between the universal and the particular is thus false.

Some scholars are worried that moving away from studying the hierarchy between the Global South and Global North through notions such as ‘multipolarity’ may obfuscate the inequalities still inherent between the two. How do you think that hierarchy and inequality can be acknowledged within the context of the multipolar world?

A strictly multipolar analysis of the world does not do justice to its growing complexity. There are no doubt many states that wield influence in world affairs. But some are more powerful than others: multipolarity ignores the hierarchy between states. Moreover, many non-state actors, ranging from financial institutions to criminal gangs, sometimes assert far greater influence than states. These dynamics, and the inequalities they engender, limit the utility of the multipolar metaphor.

Others who recognise hierarchy help us understand the enduring logics of global hierarchies based on class, race, gender and so on. But they scarcely allow for an analysis of the ways in which states and societies seek to overcome global hierarchies and assert their agency.

In this regard, I find Amitav Acharya’s thinking on multiplexity especially useful. Thinking in multiplex terms helps us to better understand how states can project power and assert their agency despite inequalities and hierarchies. A multiplex world understands different powers and their diverse positions, and their relationships which allow them to pursue interests and work together to affect change within their contexts. It can help us understand differentiation within the global South between a power South and a poor South (as well as similar differentiation within the global North). Above all, by recognising the endurance of power hierarchies and the efforts of states and societies to overcome those hierarchies, Multiplexity allows us to reinstate the agency of relatively weaker actors.