Einar Tangen – On the Drama of Trump’s Second Term and Chinese Diplomacy in the Evolving Multipolar World Order

By Deiniol Brown

Einar Tangen is a revered commentator and academic on international relations and economics, currently a senior fellow at the Taihe Institute in Beijing, the Centre for International Business Ethics at the University of International Business Economics, and the Centre for China and the World at the City University of Macau. Dr Tangen is also the Founder and Chair of Asia Narratives Substack, an organization and publication that is involved in current affairs and international politics, focussing on relationships between Asia and the world. Dr Tangen was previously appointed the Chairman of the State of Wisconsin’s International Trade Council, and has been a special advisor to the Korean government’s US investment promotion bureau at Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency. Dr Tangen has published several books, has guest lectured at Peking University and Tsinghua University amongst others, and frequently appears on television outlets around the globe discussing current affairs. In our interview, we discussed the implications of Trump’s foreign policy in his second term for the international order, China’s reaction to the Trump administration, and international economic relations between China and the EU in light of these recent developments.

In several publications you have given a great account of the motivations and influences behind the Trump administration’s foreign policy. How does China react to the Trump approach to diplomacy and international relations?

You have to divide Trump’s foreign policy between his first and second terms. In ‘Trump 1’ he used a whole array of ‘white rabbits’ and ‘red herrings’ that he unleashed on the global media on a daily basis. He moved the narrative so quickly it avoided accountability. For example, he claimed he would never let North Korea have nuclear weapons, which got quickly forgotten. He said he would get rid of the trade deficit, repeal and replace Obamacare, in total 53% of the promises he made during his first campaign weren't kept. The problem was, and is, his policies were/are talking points rather than developed and coordinated policies.

‘Trump 2’, is more of the same, for example Obamacare, We’re going to repeal  and replace Obamacare,” Trump said at a Florida rally in February 2016, but when asked at the Presidential Debate in September 2024 what his plan was, his answer was “I have concepts of a plan”. However, having served one term as president, the speed and focus of his foreign policy is markedly more intense this time around. Given he was elected to deal with domestic issues and came into the Whitehouse with the lowest approval rating of any president since 1954, it seems he is trying to join domestic and international issues using his “victimization” narrative.

China sees ‘Trump 2’ as just the latest pendulum swing in US politics, and understands that a lot of trump’s policies are just PR stunts, implemented without much long-term thought. China is addicted to planning. Every aspect of Beijing's economic strategies have to be introduced, analysed and developed at every level of the administration from the basic work units, to villages, towns, cities, provinces, and the national level, before they are ‘harmonised’ and implemented. It doesn't mean China doesn't make mistakes, simply that when they occur the process of solving them begins.

China was initially surprised by Trump 1, but has since prepared for Trump or another populist and planned accordingly. China was also surprised by Biden’s campaigning against tariffs but then leaving them in place. It signalled to Beijing that there was a broad consensus within the political elite that China was viewed by both sides of the aisle as an existential threat to American hegemony and therefore American Exceptionalism. So, as Biden pushed military alliances, trade tariffs, restrictions on sales of tech, blacklisting of Chinese companies, and individuals, China responded with indigenous innovation, expanding its trade with ASEAN, the Stans, Russia, and the rest if the Global South, and investments in the BRI.

China’s trade with ASEAN has grown from its seventh or eighth largest trade partner a few years ago, to its number one trade relationship. In part because China makes the the core inputs necessary for everything from shoes to medicines. The result is the US and Europe’s trade with ASEAN has been increasing equivalent to their trade with China. ASEAN has become an intermediary for China’s exports, allowing China to transfer end-stage manufacture and maintain control of value chains and climb the economic chain towards tertiary products. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been instrumental in assisting this process, and maintaining this economic development is central to China’s state model and national stability. That’s not to say China isn’t alarmed at the speed and scope of changes under Trump 2, but they have been anticipated and therefore mitigated. Exports used to account for 60% of China's GDP, in 2024 it was only 37% with just over 5% being connected with the US.

Trump has decided to cast aside traditional relations with neighbours and allies in favour of a go it alone strategy where he engages more with his adversaries than his allies. The main narrative is that the US and white men in particular have been victimized by its allies and competitors and their "woke" culture wars, refugees, drugs, and economic theft. Canada, Mexico, Europe, South Africa, and Taiwan have already experienced Trump's attacks in these areas. Defunding USAID, NED, and promising to do the same to the Pentagon and Intelligence agencies is being cheered by many who resented their ham-handed domestic spying, regime change, and disinformation programs. Aiding Trump in this are the new Tech Titans, like Musk, Theil, Zuckerberg, Microsoft, etc who see America's conventional military and intelligence operations as overpriced and ineffective dinosaurs. The prize is worth fighting for, military and intelligence spending is currently over 1.35 trillion dollars a year, so it is a lucrative market for those selling cyber weapons, drones, and missiles. The issue here is the Pentagon and Intelligence Agencies are entrenched in Washington and are formidable opponents. Taking them both on at the same time carries risks, because while they dislike and distrust each other they now have a common adversary.

Europe has been bracing itself for Hurricane Trump, but few expected he would colour so far outside the diplomatic, political, security, and economic lines. Disillusioned and divided, with Right Wing populists knocking at their parliamentary doors, the Europeans in place like von der Leyen and Mark Rutte are China Hawks who thought they were on the same page as Washington, who are unable to effectively deal with their own naivety.

Trump wants a Yalta style summit, ideally where he can strike a Grand Bargain that carves up the world into spheres of influence. Ideally, he would like to pit Russia and China against each other, as together they represent an existential threat to American hegemony. Given his rhetoric on Taiwan, “they stole our Chip Industry” and they don't pay enough for our protection and, Ukraine's corruption and inability to win the war, they are in Trump's mind bargaining chips for his proposals.

In terms of the multipolar world, middle powers like Turkey, Egypt, The Stans, Iran, Brazil, Indonesia, etc… are essential to peace and trade. They are strong regional players at a time when regionalism is on the rise, as the UN struggles with paralysis due to US unilateralism and support for Israel. The question is what the rest of the world is going to do when it's most powerful member goes rogue. If Europe realizes that they would be better served leading the opposition against Trump rather than being subservient to his MAGA agenda, America could end up isolated politically, economically, and socially.

China is watching Trump run towards a cliff, and feels no need to be near when he falls off it. Trump has done what China could not, by alienating its neighbours and allies. It is not a question of taking advantage of the situation, it's a matter of just being the calm consistent adult in the room as Trump continues his victimization tantrum. Wang Yi’s recent speech at the Munich Security Conference quoted some famous lines of poetry; “Let the strong do as they will; we remain as unperturbed as the gentle breeze caresses the hills” which illustrates exactly China’s position, it will remain calm in the faces of forces it cannot control.

Another of your recent articles discussed the perpetual claims around ‘Peak China’ which have so far been disproved. Why do these claims continue to arise and why do western research institutions have an issue with understanding the Chinese economy?

The idea of ‘Peak China’ is laughable with the speed of development in China, just look at their EV market, or the development of DeepSeek. The US has a long history of engagement with the Chinese economy; in the seventies Nixon engaged in a bid to isolate Russia, and in 2001, the US admitted China to the WTO, with the belief this would encourage democratisation. However, the link between capitalism and democracy in the minds of the US is a collective illusion, and China continued its planned economy in the WTO with great success. After 2008, the US is hit heavily, which confirms a lot of the fears in China, and demonstrates the shortcomings of the market economy system. Since this period, narratives have started emerging about China’s economy beginning to stall, with a revolving door of reasoning behind it.

A few years ago I met a senior politician who also wrote for the economist, and who frequently claimed that the Chinese economy was on the verge of collapse. I asked him why he thought this, and he said it was evident from the data, however there is no conclusive data supporting this, and his predictions have been wrong every year. There is an engrained belief that free market economics are a ‘one size fits all’ for the entire world, but this is wrong; different countries will always have different approaches. Countries are complex entities, with many diverse internal actors and differentiations. You can't put them all in a box and tell them how to run their economy, but the US still thinks it can homogenise the global economy with enough effort.

You often mention the idea of China as a ‘civilisation’ state, and have mentioned the ‘Global Civilisation Initiative’ as China’s framework for multilateralism. Can you expand on this?

I believe there is a fundamental difference in how the US and China views themselves. The US still sees themselves as an empire; an empire believes that success comes from taking things from others, expanding by force. There are many examples of empires throughout history, including China’s past. Civilisations always start as Empires, but some transition to civilization states when they look to manage what they have rather than taking more.

Civilizations in the past weren't necessarily peaceful or positive; the suppression of the Chinese peasants was brutal. However, successful civilisations focus on maintaining order and securing the essentials. China as a modern ‘civilisation state’ focuses on social and development issues domestically and cooperation with other states internationally.

The civilisational approach is based on a set of pragmatic principles rather than an ideology. China's three pillars that can unite a multipolar world with major, political, economic and cultural issues are its security, development and Civilization Initiatives. Under this approach each state is recognized as a complex mosaic of people and cultures, languages, and beliefs that must be understood and respected. These Initiatives also hold the promise of unleashing a new powerful economic force that could drive massive changes in the global markets. Currently SME are 50% of the world's GDP and are 60% to 80% of all employment in countries depending on the their economic level. Digitalization will allow SME's to move beyond their local markets, through online advertising and distribution, lower transaction costs via efficient electronic transaction platforms, and logistic chains that can support everything from the miniscule to the massive.

In light of the US distancing from the world stage and from Europe, how is the China-Europe relationship developing currently?

Before the Ukraine war, China and Europe were relatively close compared to the US, especially countries like Germany and Italy. I have met and got to know a lot of the diplomatic community in Beijing, and it was clear that they began to distance themselves because of the Ukraine war. European countries demanded that China support them against Russia, casting it as a moral imperative, however China, while disliking the interference in the territory and affairs of one country by another, saw the problems of NATO expansion into previous Soviet Bloc countries, something the US had promised not to do.

However, Europe is at a point where they realize Trump and his policies rather than being aberrations are emblematic of a change in American attitudes and policies. The current debate about the role of ‘values’ in international relations show the US and EU diverging, especially around issues like climate change, the WHO, and international commitments. I just spoke to some members of various delegations returning from the Munich Security Conference, and they reported there is a new attitude towards China in Europe, where last year and the pandemic years things were very frosty, feelings were much warmer towards the Chinese attendees.

There are still hard feelings, but Europe is feeling more isolated, and in need of cooperation. China is an important economic market and one Europe will have to consider as they try to avoid an economic collapse. There are shared concerns as well, both are interested in maintaining institutions such as the WHO, and are concerned about the destabilising effects of the US’s recent policies.

Tell me about the work of the Taihe institute, and the landscape of research institutions in the area of international relations

Broadly speaking there are three levels of think tank in China. The first level is government connected think tanks, which do work specifically for the government as requested. The second is university think tanks, which are hybrid; working for both the government and private sector. The third level are independent think tanks, which often have government links but are officially separate. These can be either non-profit institutions or businesses that provide research and consultancy style services for a fee. I currently sit on two think tanks at the university level. I was approached by a number of private think tanks, but was not enthused by the majority as they tended to be one person focused rather than institutional, i.e. the longevity of the institution depended on the longevity of its founder. Taihe is different, with over 150 fellows, many of whom are retired government officials, as well as prominent academics, business and media professionals, the institute is not dependant on one person but something closer to US and EU think tanks which only need to stay relevant to continue. This has given Taihe an international platform, and allowing it to play an important role in facilitating communications between people inside and outside of China.

I am a foreign content editor for TIO, the Institute's monthly publication, for which I also write papers for, I attend forums on behalf of the institute, and help their international visibility through the shows I do which reach markets of 7 billion most weeks. One of Taihe’s unique accomplishments is its role over the last ten years in developing the discourse around civilisation. The Institute has a yearly ‘Civilisation Forum’ which encourages dialogues with other states, and is an important two way bridge for understanding between China and the World.

What has been your own career and research journey?

I was raised for roughly the first third of my life between Cambridge, Massachusetts and Oxford, England, and was surrounded by fascinating people at a young age; Nobel laureates, poets, politicians, came to our house and influenced my perspective on the world. For the second third of my life I went to Wisconsin where my father's family had businesses. I attended Lawrence university in Appleton Wisconsin, an elite small school with a 8 to 1 ratio of students to professors. It created a lot of pressure to perform and interactions with my professors. I graduated in English with a focus on comparative literature, which I viewed as the key to understanding the people and countries of the world, both in terms of similarities and differences. After university I attended Marquette law school, where I graduated. I worked in the County DA’s office as an intern as part of my training, which I enjoyed and had a major impacted on my perspective, in terms of the need and responsibility of those with advantages to use them to help others. I later was invited to become a partner in a small law firm, and through my partners became very engaged in civil society and government in Milwaukee, I served as the Chairman of the Debt Commission, Board of Zoning Appeals, Architectural Review Board, Business District No 2, the Historic Third Ward Association, Lao Family, Asian Moon Festival among other boards both business and charitable. At the State level I served on the reform of the Jury Selection Legislative committee, Chairman of the International Trade council amongst others. I was on a subsidiary board for the Home Loan Bank of Chicago, I ran local elections and participated in state and national elections. I was an advisor to KOTRA's (Korean inbound outbound trade office) Midwest area which covered 11 states. I also worked for Stifel Nicolaus in public/private bond finance. But as much as I liked my friends, I still desired a bit of what I had growing up in university towns.

Around the year 2000, I visited China and was instantly drawn to the desire of everyone I met to learn. In 2005 I moved to China, initially I helped establish an architecture business, but became friends with a person who asked me to write some books and asked me to go on TV as a commentator. I was a bit hesitant but after a while really enjoyed the preparations for shows, actually more than the shows themselves. Preparing for a show is an opportunity to learn, speaking during a show I learn nothing from my own voice. Having met some Ambassadors socially when I went on TV I was often asked to brief visiting officials from different countries as well as Ambassadors. Over the years I have made some good friends there as well as at the Beijing Beef and Burgundy Club, China's oldest food and wine society. I now talk at events internationally, meet interesting people in positions of power, write articles, the occasional book, and appearing on average about 10 times a week on TV and Radio channels for over 40 stations spanning the globe. Someone who does media stats once told me I reach audiences of about 7 billion most weeks, my reply was unfortunately only 60,000 actually watch.