Interview with Dr Peter Wilson – The English School and International Society in a Multipolar World
Dr Peter Wilson is an Associate Professor at the LSE’s Department of International Relations. Professor Wilson has written extensively on a number of topics in international relations, and the history of international relations thought. In particular, Professor Wilson has published on early twentieth century debates in international relations theory, and the English School of international relations. Several of his recent publications address issues such as Brexit, international sanctions and global disorder through an English School lens. In this interview, we explore the topics of global disorder and multipolarity further in light of the English School’s concept of the ‘International Society of States’ and delve into conceptual debates within the English School.
You recently reviewed the book Global Discord: Values and Power in a fractured world order by Paul Tucker, which discusses the future of norms-based international order. In this book, Tucker offers a series of potential future scenarios for the international order, which do you find most likely?
I think the most convincing is his second scenario; superpower struggle, where confrontation becomes increasingly intense, but without boiling over into conflict. I also think elements of his first scenario; the lingering status quo, and third; new cold war, are relevant, although it is extremely difficult to predict. One of the main changes since this was published is the election of Donald Trump in the US which has doubtless added some volatility to the situation, but four years can go very quickly, and its long-term impact may not be profound. The West’s relationship with China will definitely become more tense. However China and Russia’s closer relationship is shallow and brittle, and doesn’t constitute a strong alliance. Russia is an aggressive and rogue actor, but is much less consequential to the US and its allies than China.
Paul Tucker ultimately took on a very difficult question with this book, and he ends up creating a complicated conclusion with many different aspects. I think it’s important for a writer to be able to distil big debates into succinct narratives in their work, and this could have been more concisely. English school writers such as Hedley Bull, Alan James, Robert Jackson and James Mayall were very skilled at doing this. Tucker is new to IR and is less skilled, though remarkably well read and intelligent. Regarding Tucker’s view of the ‘liberal world order’, I don’t think that the world order has ever been western, or liberal. People often make this assumption, but liberalism exists as one element amongst many. For many years, different elements have coexisted unstably within the international order, with some becoming temporarily dominant, but with the others remaining present. We are currently seeing a resurgence of the realist element over the liberal-rationalist element that has been dominant since 1989.
Looking back at your article written on the long-term consequences of Brexit for Britain’s position in the international order, what do you think have been the wider impacts, especially considering the debates since Brexit about the ECHR and other institutions?
There has been some increase in hostility towards many international institutions such as the ECHR from some corners of the right wing in British politics. For example, in Robert Jenrick’s bid for conservative party leadership he said he wanted to abandon the ECHR. However, it is not clear what the right’s wider position on international institutions is, and Jenrick didn’t expand on whether he wanted to withdraw from all of the ECHR, or just amend it. In any case, abandoning the ECHR is largely a symbolic policy used to direct blame towards the UK’s ongoing immigration strategy, and would be unlikely to make a major material difference to immigration, which is mostly affected by the structural issues of labour supply in the UK. The far right has been buoyed in the UK since Brexit, especially with the success of Reform in the most recent elections, but it’s not obvious if they are more broadly sceptical of international institutions like some far-right movements have been. Reform’s manifesto didn’t mention anything about the UN or the WTO, or even the Commonwealth, and many of their policies are motivated by populism rather than deep political convictions.
In another article, you criticise the abstractions of some English School scholars around the idea of institutions in international relations. What do you think is the best way to conceptualise institutions in the international system?
There is no consensus on how to define institutions in the English School; on how many there are and what these institutions are. I don’t necessarily dismiss the array of primary institutions suggested by scholars but I’m a sceptic of this approach, I prefer to talk in terms of the principles, rules and norms of international society rather than institutions. I think there’s nothing wrong with scholars using institutions as a means to analyse international relations, but the potential for conceptual proliferation is great and the number of suggested primary institutions continues to increase over the years. Most importantly, international society consists of a social fabric. That fabric is made up of principles, rules, expectations, norms and practices. If we really want to understand international relations, we need to study this complex fabric. In the English School, ‘primary institutions’ has become a synonym for this state of affairs, but it can lead to the international order being portrayed as much more coherent and rational than it actually is.
If you take one thing from this interview it is that international order has always been fragmented. That’s not to say that order is the exception in international relations; order is still the rule even in the current situation. But there has never been a time when the element of disorder is absent. I find the best explanation for that enduring order is the international society in action, the effect of those rules and norms on states. International law is of course important in codifying those norms for the society of states. Every country accepts some necessity of international law, even North Korea, although they may not agree with specific laws, they don’t reject the need for international law as a whole. Russia as well is still trying to appeal to international law and manipulate it for their own ends. They may want to tear out a few pages, but they don’t want to get rid of the whole rule book.
Where does the society of states lie in what some scholars have labelled an emerging multipolar world order?
Barry Buzan’s idea of concentric circles of international society remains valid. There is still a western core or European states, the US, Japan, South Korea and a few others, and other states such as Iran, Russia and North Korea towards the periphery. Between 1989 and about 2014 there was an attempt to relegate great power politics to the past, but in recent years China and Russia have been trying to re-establish their own spheres of influence. If you look at Putin for example, in a recent press conference he was asked if he thought he would leave Russia in a better position at the end of his tenure than at the beginning. In his answer he said that he had protected and enhanced Russia’s sovereignty, but what he really means is that he’s expanded Russia’s sphere of influence. The establishment of these spheres of influence, mostly by Russia and China, is what has driven this instability in recent years. However, these more revisionist powers don’t reject international society, and operate within it to a large extent. Sovereignty itself is a key norm in the international society, and one that Russia clearly complies with. One way of capturing this of course is through the English school distinction between pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international society. We may not have returned to the Cold War in recent years, with all that entails for the prospect of war between the major powers, but the solidarist element in international society is on the retreat in many speres of activity. Interestingly, however, not in the environmental sphere. Though Trump I and now Trump II are a blow.
What role does the global market play in the English School understanding of international society, and specifically in its contemporary form?
The market is still a strong binding force in the international society, and states largely support the long-held norms of the market. China especially wants to be more assertive in its foreign and economic policy, but this is compromised by its reliance on western markets and investment. China would like to increase its own economic independence from the west, but that is a long way off, and the US continues to be more dynamic and market-capturing in its economy. Economic interdependence has been an enormous force in international relations in the last one hundred years, and this has disciplined, and constrained states’ expansionist aims. China is still largely a status quo power, and wants to access the benefits of global market integration. The market is highly disciplinary but doesn’t enforce anything on states. Rather it disincentivises certain behaviours and incentivises others. Breaking market rules in scale and frequency comes at a high cost which China is mindful not to pay. It values domestic stability and, despite sabre rattling over Taiwan, international stability too much.
Just because there are short term benefits for some foreign policy decisions, such as China invading Taiwan for example, doesn’t mean they are going to happen.
Linking the dynamics of the global economy to our earlier conversation, it is very unlikely that international society is going to fracture entirely it has always accepted nuances and differences particularly in its pluralist guise. Differing economic policies and tensions between states on a wide range of matters is a feature of international society, not evidence of its collapse. In brief, international society is an evolved set of norms that enables states to manage their differences.